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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The test for remoteness of damages laid down in Hadley v Baxendale1 has 
survived more than a century and a half with comparatively little meddling 
from the English courts.  That is not to say there has been no attempt at 
refinement or clarification.2  The recent decision in The Achilleas3 saw five 
Law Lords coming to the same conclusion as to the rule’s effect but for very 
different reasons.   
This dissertation will consider the historical development of the Hadley v 
Baxendale rule, its rationale, its application in the later English cases of 
Nettleship,4 Victoria Laundry5 and The Heron II,6 the approaches adopted by 
the House of Lords in The Achilleas, its subsequent effect in The Amer Energy7 
and The Sylvia,8 the difference in approach adopted in tort and finally will 
conclude with a comparison of the approaches to assessing remoteness of 
damages in English and South African law.   
How the claimant/plaintiff proves his breach, the quantum of his losses and 
issues surrounding factual causation, including mitigation, fall beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.   
 
                                                        
1 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 150 ER 145. 
2 “Although the principle stated in Hadley v Baxendale (note 1) remains the fons et origo of the modern 
law, the principle itself has been analysed and developed, and its application broadened, in the 20th 
century” per Robert Goff J in The Pegase [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175 at 181. 
3 The Achilleas [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275 (HL). 
4 The British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island Spar, Lumber and Saw-mill Company Limited v Nettleship 
[1868] LR 3 CP 499. 
5 Victoria Laundry v Newman [1949] 2 KB 528 CA. 
6 The Heron II [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457 (HL). 
7 The Amer Energy [2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep 293.  
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2.  OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES 
 
The legal rules governing contractual damages are developed by the courts 
through the doctrine of precedent and with reference to case law in other 
jurisdictions and recognised legal writings.  There is comparatively little 
statutory interference in this area of law, allowing for more flexibility in 
interpretation than in those other areas more closely regulated by the 
legislature.  For the common law “is not static and inert but a living and 
growing thing, ready to meet and adapt itself to the changing needs of 
time.”9   
The general rule10 under both English and South African law is that a 
claimant/plaintiff is entitled to claim a sum of money, known as damages, 
from the defendant sufficient to place him in the same position as if the 
contract had been performed11 provided he can prove (a) the defendant 
breached their contract (b) as a result of which (c) he suffered a loss and (d) 
that loss is not too remote.   
Under the principle of “he who avers must prove” the onus falls on the 
claimant/plaintiff to show, on a balance of probabilities, that he is entitled to 
the damages claimed.12   
Without the limitations of causation and remoteness,13 the defendant 
breaching a co tract faces a potentially large exposure.  An unlucky 
                                                        
9 Per Salmon LJ in The Heron II [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep 595 (AC) at 612. 
10 The position may be different, for example, in a claim for specific performance or in the case of a 
repudiatory breach. 
11 “[W]here a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to 
be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.” per 
Baron Parke in Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850 at 855.  Also “there is a clear rule, that the amount 
which would have been received if the contract had been kept, is the measure of damages if the 
contract is broken” per Chief Baron Pollock in Alder v Keighley (1846) 15 M & W 117 at 120 as cited in 
Hadley v Baxendale (note 1) at 355.  This model (referred to as “expectation interest” under English law 
or “positive interest” under South African law) is not the only basis for calculating damages following 
breach of contract.  In addition, English law recognises the principles of restitutionary interest and 
reliance interest (see Richard Stone The Modern Law of Contract 8ed (2009) see at 601 to 610) while South 
African law applies the theory of negative interest to delictual claims (see van der Merwe Contract 
General Principles 3ed (2008) at 420 to 425). 
12 Harvey McGregor McGregor on Damages 18ed (2009) at 105 and Van Der Merwe (note 11) at 415.   
13 McGregor (note 12) at 104 argues that the term “remoteness” incorporates both causation in law and 
the “scope of the protection afforded by the law”.  For the purposes of this thesis, the former is referred 
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defendant could find himself facing a substantial claim for damages 
following a comparatively minor breach while the claimant/plaintiff stands 
to gain “a complete indemnity for all losses de facto resulting from a 
particular breach, however improbable, however unpredictable.”14 
The test laid down in Hadley v Baxendale was designed to address these issues 
of fairness and justice by limiting the damages a claimant/plaintiff might be 
awarded in the event of a contractual breach, though the facts of The Achilleas 
have tested its very construction. 
                                                        










MELISSA DEACON (DCNMEL001)  PAGE  6 
3.  ENGLISH LAW 
 
3.1.  The facts, the decision and the original rule in Hadley v Baxendale  
3.1.1.  The facts in Hadley v Baxendale 
On 11 May 1853 the crankshaft of the steam engine that the claimants used to 
work their lucrative flourmill broke.  The claimants contracted with the 
common carrier defendants15 to transport the broken crankshaft to the repair 
yard where it was required for use as a template in manufacturing the new 
one.  Its delivery to the yard was delayed when the defendants shipped it by 
canal on its final leg to the repairers’ yard instead of using the newer and 
faster rail service available.16 
The claimants contended that, as a result of the unreasonably long time taken 
by the defendants to transport the broken crankshaft to Greenwich, the 
manufacture and delivery of the new crankshaft was delayed by some five 
days.  The claimants claimed their loss of profit for those additional five 
days.  
The defendants argued that the damages claimed were too remote.17   
3.1.2.  The rule in Hadley v Baxendale 
Delivering a single judgement for the court, Baron Alderson defined the 
modern test for remoteness of damages in the now famous passage as 
follows:  
“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them 
has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive 
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may 
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. 
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of 
                                                        
15 Trading as Pickfords & Co, today a household name. 
16 Richard Danzig ‘Hadley v Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law’ (1975) 4 Journal of 
Legal Studies 249 at 251. 
17 Prior to Hadley v Baxendale (note 1), the courts generally awarded all losses proved as factually 
caused by the breach and that were not aggravated by the claimant’s actions, per Danzig (note 16) at 
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contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have 
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made 
the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. 
Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was 
actually made were communicated by the claimants to the 
defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages 
resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would 
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which 
would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these 
special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the 
other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly 
unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, 
could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the 
amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great 
multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, 
from such a breach of contract. For, had the special 
circumstances been known, the parties might have specially 
provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the 
damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very 
unjust to deprive them.”18  
Baron Alderson went on to apply this rule to the facts, finding that the 
loss in question fell under neither its first limb (because it did not flow 
naturally from the breach “in the great multitude of such cases 
occurring under ordinary circumstances”) nor its second limb 
(because there were no “special circumstances … communicated to or 
known by the defendants” which might “have made it a reasonable 
and natural consequence of such breach”).19    
Suggesting the claimants were not entitled to damages for the additional loss 
of profits claim, the court concluded that the first instance judge should 
                                                        
18 Hadley v Baxendale (note 1) at 355. 
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“have told the jury, that, upon the facts then before them, they ought not to 
take the loss of profits into consideration at all in estimating the damages.”20   
3.1.3.  One rule or two?  Analysing the test in Hadley v Baxendale 
Initially Hadley v Baxendale was regarded as establishing three rules21 and 
later two rules with separate tests but today it is generally seen as one rule or 
principle with two limbs or branches.22   
Linking the two limbs is the idea of “relevant”23 or “particular”24 knowledge.  
A degree of general knowledge is required under the first limb while the 
second limb depends on actual knowledge of some special facts, conditions 
or circumstances at the time of contracting. 
On the given facts of a case, there may be differences of opinion as to which 
limb applies and there may even be some losses that fall under both limbs.25  
The damages awarded in Victoria Laundry are an example of the latter – they 
were both specifically notified to the defendants as well as considered to be 
within the defendants’ imputed knowledge. 
Not everyone is persuaded by the usefulness of referring to limbs rather than 
rules26 but it does serve to underscore the role played by knowledge in both 
limbs, as identified in Victoria Laundry.  It also allows for the possible 




20 Supra at 356 – 357.  Most civil trials in the mid-19th Century were still resolved by a jury who 
determined the sum of damages to be awarded in accordance with guidelines issued by the judges.  
The jury’s power to do so was not completely unfettered and could be reviewed on appeal by a panel 
of judges, as happened in the case of Hadley v Baxendale (note 1).  Although it would have been unusual 
for the judge to go so far as to set out how the jury should have applied the facts in that case and what 
their outcome should be, as Baron Alderson did in Hadley v Baxendale (note 1).  See Danzig (note 16) at 
254 - 255.    
21 McGregor (note 12) at 201 – 202.  
22 “[I]t was [not] intended that there were to be two rules or that two different standards or tests were 
to be applied” per Lord Reid in The Heron II (note 6) HL at 463.  This approach has found widespread 
support in the judgements of Victoria Laundry (note 5), The Heron II (note 6), The Pegase (note 2) and The 
Achilleas (note 3). 
23 The Pegase (note 2) at 182. 
24 Lord Walker in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 288. 
25 Lord Pearce in The Heron II (note 6) HL at 481. 
26 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 484. 
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3.1.4.  Why was it necessary?  The rationale behind the rule 
Even before Hadley v Baxendale, the courts had started to recognise the 
potentially inequitable result of determining damages through a factual 
causation test alone but, until then, had failed to formulate a satisfactory test 
limiting such damages.28   
Considerations of fairness and justice dictate that parties who have freedom 
of contract should bear responsibility for failing to regulate their risks under 
that contract.  Put another way, a defendant who fails to regulate his liability 
in respect of a risk that he is aware of at the time of contracting, should not 
be allowed to benefit by later avoiding liability in the event of a loss.     
While it may be a simplistic view of commercial realities to suggest that a 
defendant who fails to do so due to his weaker bargaining position can 
simply choose to either accept those risks or refuse to contract on those 
terms, the rule does fulfill a function in allocating risks between the 
contracting parties on grounds of fairness and justice.   
From this it follows that considerations of fairness also require parties to be 
put on notice of any “special circumstances” that might influence the terms 
on which they choose to contract.29  
3.1.5.  How was it applied?  Important later cases referring to Hadley v 
Baxendale 
Numerous judgements have applied the rule in the intervening century and 
a half since Hadley v Baxendale.  It is not within the scope of this dissertation 
to consider all of them.   
The cases of Nettleship, Victoria Laundry and The Heron II stand out as having 
played an important role addressing issues such as the nature and 
interpretation of the rule.  The influence of this triumvirate of judgements is 
clear in the more recent decision of The Achilleas and its subsequent 
application in The Sylvia. 
                                                        
28 Andrew Tettenborn ‘Hadley v Baxendale: Contract Doctrine or Compensation Rule?’ (2005) 11 Texas 
Wesleyan Law Review 505 at 506. 
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3.2.  Implied terms in Nettleship 
The Nettleship claimants engaged the defendants to carry boxes of machinery 
from Glasgow to Vancouver but one of the boxes was not delivered.  
Without the machinery contained in that crucial box, the claimants could not 
complete the construction of their sawing-mill.  They had to send for 
replacement machinery from England, delaying the construction of the mill 
by nearly a year.   
In addition to the costs of obtaining and transporting the replacement parts, 
which losses were agreed to be due by the defendants, the claimants also 
claimed damages resulting from the delay to the construction of the mill.  It 
was this latter loss of profits claim that was the subject of the dispute. 
At the time he agreed to carry the goods, the Master30 was found to be aware 
that the various boxes contained machinery for the construction of a sawing-
mill for the claimants’ business of timber sawing and cutting in British 
Columbia.   
However, the court found that the defendants were not made aware that the 
missing box contained parts essential for completing the construction of the 
mill and that replacement parts could only be sourced from England.   
Applying the second limb of the Hadley v Baxendale test, the court decided 
that the defendants did not have the necessary special knowledge required to 
hold them liable for the additional loss of profits claimed. 
3.2.1.  Is mere knowledge enough? 
Willes J31 in Nettleship suggested that, under the second limb of the test, the 
defendant must have had both actual knowledge of the special conditions 
and also have accepted those special conditions as forming part of the 
contract, such that the defendant can reasonably be taken to have 
contemplated accepting liability for a breach at the time of contracting.32   
                                                        
30 Who was also part-owner of the vessel in question, as was common at that time.  
31 In an interesting connection, Danzig (note 16) at 276 identifies Willes J as having acted as counsel for 
Baxendale in Hadley v Baxendale (note 1) on appeal before he became a judge. 
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While the incorporation of a term into the contract as suggested by Nettleship 
has since been rejected,33 the idea that knowledge alone is not enough has 
found support from time to time in the authorities and academic writings.  
Most recently, Lord Hoffmann’s judgement in The Achilleas has reignited this 
debate.   
 
3.3.  Restatement of the rule in Victoria Laundry 
Nearly a century after Hadley v Baxendale, “the abundance of phraseology 
and the breakdown of the rule into two parts, led to confusion, and a 
restatement of the rule for modern conditions became a real need.  This 
restatement came with the Court of Appeal decision in 1949 in Victoria 
Laundry.”34 
The defendant engineering company sold a boiler, which they were told was 
for immediate commercial use, to the claimant laundry and dyeing company.  
However, the unit was only delivered some five months after the contractual 
delivery date as it had been dropped by the defendant’s sub-contractors 
prior to delivery and needed to be repaired. 
The claimants claimed for (a) loss of profits from the “ordinary” new 
business they would have gained if the boiler had been delivered on time 
and (b) loss of profits from a series of highly lucrative dyeing contracts for 
the Ministry of Supply, which they said they would have been awarded if 
the delivery had not been delayed. 
Lord Justice Asquith extracted various propositions35 from his detailed 
analysis of the relevant authorities, which included Hadley v Baxendale and 
Nettleship, concluding, in short, the benchmark for the defendant’s liability to 
                                                        
33 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 484 and McGregor (note 12) at 226 – 227.  
34 McGregor (note 12) at 202. 
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be reasonable foreseeability36 as defined and as determined by the actual or 
implied or imputed knowledge of the parties, objectively ascertained.37   
Applying these principles to the facts in question, the court considered what 
information the defendants would have known and what information they 
could be taken to have known at the material time. 
The court concluded that the portion of losses alleged in respect of (b) the 
highly lucrative dyeing contracts, could not be claimed.  The defendants 
were not put on notice, at the time of contracting, of the prospects and terms 
of these particular dyeing contracts.  Therefore this loss did not fall under the 
second limb of the Hadley v Baxendale test and the claimant’s claim failed. 
This did not preclude the claimants from claiming in respect of their (a) 
ordinary loss of profits under both limbs of the test.  Although the 
defendants were not manufacturers or dealers in boilers, the court found that 
they knew more than the “plain man” about boilers and the purposes for 
which they are used by laundries.  The defendants were told, at the time of 
contracting, that the claimants wanted the boiler for immediate use in their 
laundry and dyeing business.   
Therefore, the defendants had sufficient information to know that a delay in 
delivery was likely or liable to result in a loss of business for the claimants.  It 
was clear to a reasonable man in the place of the defendants that, even 
without such express notification, a delay in delivery was likely or liable to 
result in loss of business.  
3.3.1.  Determining knowledge under the first limb 
The defendant is taken to possess the same basic knowledge as a reasonable 
man in his position, allowing him to identify those losses that would be 
“liable to result”38 in the ordinary course of things from a particular breach.  
The actual knowledge held by the particular defendant is not taken into 
account under this limb. 
                                                        
36 The use of the phrase “reasonable foreseeability” was criticised by Lord Reid in The Heron II (note 6) 
HL for blurring the line between the test under tort and contract.  See discussion below at 3.7.4. 
37 McGregor (note 12) at 203. 
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In determining the basic level of knowledge held by a reasonable man in the 
defendant’s position, the court will consider the nature of the parties’ 
business or profession and the type of the contract.39   
So where the defendant carrier is not in the same business field or trade as 
the claimant,40 he cannot be expected, in the absence of special knowledge, to 
contemplate losses other than those “liable to result” in the ordinary course 
of things.  
A common carrier defendant such as in Hadley v Baxendale, is generally taken 
to know less about a claimant seller’s business and, therefore, less about the 
sort of consequences that might result from delayed delivery of the cargo, 
than a manufacturer or a supplier or even a specialist engineer defendant, 
such as in Victoria Laundry.41   
Claims against carriers for loss of profits after failing to deliver goods, 
delivering goods late or delivering damaged goods often fail for this 
reason.42  Although the basic principle remains the same, its application to 
different facts leads to different results.43 
Where a defendant fails to supply or accept goods, the courts will generally 
consider him “to have contemplated that changes might arise in the state of 
the market.”44  Even a carrier, though not supplying or accepting goods, can 
be taken to have contemplated changes in the market at the port of discharge 
if the vessel is delayed through his fault.45  
                                                        
39 McGregor (note 12) at 221 - 224. 
40 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 487. 
41 “A carrier commonly knows less than a seller about the purposes for which the buyer or consignee 
needs the goods, or about other ‘special circumstances’ which may cause exceptional loss if due 
delivery is withheld” per Victoria Laundry (note 5) at 537.  Also see The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 288 per 
Lord Walker. 
42 McGregor (note 12) at 232. 
43 Victoria Laundry (note 5) at 536 and The Pegase (note 2) at 185.  In Hadley v Baxendale (note 1) the court 
found that the defendants could assume the claimants would have had a back-up crankshaft.  This is a 
strange conclusion if the defendants are supposed to have little or no knowledge of the claimants’ 
business.  Danzig (note 16) at 267 reminds us that at least some of the bench had intimate knowledge of 
the defendants’ business so they may have been applying their existing knowledge to the facts.  
44 McGregor (note 12) at 224. 
45 “In most cases the loss of market will be found to be within the contemplation of the parties in 
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3.3.2.  Determining knowledge under the second limb 
For a defendant to be liable for losses arising over and above those “in the 
usual course of things” under the first limb, he must be made aware, at the 
time of contracting, of special circumstances that a reasonable person in his 
position would consider as “liable to result”46 in such losses in the event of a 
breach.  Again this is an objective test but founded on the defendant’s actual 
knowledge. 
Although the court found no such notice was given to the defendant in the 
case of Hadley v Baxendale, in fact evidence was led to show that the claimant 
had informed the defendant’s local representative of the urgency of their 
situation when booking the shipment.  However, according to the 
underdeveloped laws of agency and liability in play at the time of the 
judgement,47 mere notice to a representative was not sufficient to bind the 
defendant.  Had the facts repeated themselves today, perhaps this evidence 
would have carried more weight and influenced the court’s ultimate 
decision. 
The claimant in Victoria Laundry was also unsuccessful under the second 
limb, having failed to show that he put the defendant on notice, at the time of 
contracting, of the potentially lucrative dyeing contracts. 
The second limb test does not necessarily work in the claimant’s favour 
every time.  Any benefit that the claimant might have gained but for the 
breach can be taken into account when assessing damages, potentially 
reducing (rather than increasing) the amount due to the claimants.  An 
example of such a benefit would be the profit the claimant would have made 
under a sub-sale.48  
                                                        
46 See criticism of the phrase “liable to result” below at 17. 
47 Danzig (note 16) at 262 – 263. 
48 As suggested in Biggin v Permanite [1951] 1 KB 422 as cited in McGregor (note 12) at 220 and later 
followed in Louis Dreyfus Trading Ltd v Reliance Trading Ltd [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 243 as cited in 
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Victoria Laundry has been said to sit “uneasily with the principle that it is the 
type or kind of loss which matters and not its extent”49 but can be explained 
through the distinction between the different kind or type of contracts 
usually entered into between such parties: The Victoria Laundry claim for the 
particularly lucrative contracts did not fail because the contracts were 
lucrative but because they were not of the kind or type of contract that the 
parties could reasonably be taken to have foreseen.50   
3.3.3.  Timing 
The actual or imputed knowledge held by the defendant is determined as at 
the time of contracting.  Knowledge gained after the parties entered into the 
contract, even if gained before the breach, will not bind the defendant.   
This is clear from the wording used in Hadley v Baxendale51 and also flows 
logically from the rationale behind the rule.52  If the parties are to be given an 
opportunity to regulate their risks then the time for determining those risks 
must be at or before the time of contracting.  A cut-off point is necessary to 
limit recovery under factual causation.53 
3.3.4.  Where/who must the knowledge come from? 
The extent of the knowledge imputed to the defendant under the first limb 
comes from the general knowledge attributed to a reasonable man in his 
position.   
Knowledge held by the defendant under the second limb comes from the 
special circumstances communicated to him by the claimant.  Under the 
general principles of causation, the claimant cannot be liable to the defendant 
where the losses arise from facts told to the defendant by a third party.54 
                                                        
49 Paul CK Wee “Contractual interpretation and remoteness” (2010) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 151 at 153.at 172. 
50 Wee (note 49) at 172.  However, Robert Duxbury in Contract Law (2008) at 383 suggests the ordinary 
and the lucrative dyeing contracts in Victoria Laundry could arguably be considered as the same kind or 
type of loss and that the only distinction might therefore be their extent. 
51 Hadley v Baxendale  (note 1) at 355. 
52 McGregor (note 12) at 225. 
53 Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 366 at 370. 
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3.4.  Refinement in The Heron II 
While subsequent decisions largely agree with Victoria Laundry’s “lucid 
restatement of principle”,55 it has been criticised, particularly in The Heron II, 
for its use of the phrase “reasonable foreseeability” and the ambit of the 
phrase “liable to result”.56  
The claimant charterers, shippers and cargo owners in The Heron II entered 
into a voyage charterparty with the defendant ship owners for the carriage of 
a cargo of sugar from Constantza to Basrah.   
The owners knew there was a market for sugar at Basrah and that the 
charterers intended to sell the cargo on arrival at Basrah but they did not 
have detailed knowledge of that market.   
En route to Basrah, the owners deviated to load and discharge a cargo of 
livestock for their own account and to take on additional bunkers.  This 
deviation caused a delay of nine days in the vessel’s journey.  During this 
time, the market for sugar at Basrah fell. 
The parties agreed damages for delay as a result of the breach were payable.  
They disagreed as to how those damages should be calculated. 
The charterers claimed damages for delay calculated as the difference 
between the market values of the cargo at the day when it should have 
arrived and at the day when it did in fact arrive. 
The owners countered that loss of market was too remote to be recoverable 
as damages.  Applying The Parana,57 they argued the correct measure of 
damages for delay in the case of carriage of goods by sea (as opposed to 
carriage by land) was not loss of market but interest on the value of the cargo 
over the period of the delay.   
The charterers succeeded before the House of Lords by applying the first 
limb of the Hadley v Baxendale test, there being no suggestion of any “special 
circumstances” such as to bring the claim under the second limb.  
                                                        
55 McGregor (note 12) at 203. 
56 Supra at 205 – 206 and The Heron II (note 6) HL at 466.   
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Lord Reid set out the test to be applied as follows:   
Is the loss in question “of a kind which the defendant, when he made 
the contract, ought to have realised was not unlikely to result from the 
breach … the words ‘not unlikely’ … denoting a degree of probability 
considerably less than an even chance but nevertheless not very 
unusual and easily foreseeable”?58 
3.4.1.  Development of the Victoria Laundry principles 
Lord Reid’s refinement of the test, as quoted above, largely follows the 
principles laid down in Victoria Laundry.59   
His emphasis on the importance of determining whether the loss in question 
was of a particular “kind” or “type” has generally found favour in 
subsequent decisions.60  This issue is particularly relevant when considering 
the extent of the losses that can be claimed.61 
Lord Reid objected, however, to Victoria Laundry’s use of the phrase 
“reasonable forseeability” for being too close to the test in tort and the phrase 
“liable to result” for not denoting the correct degree of probability with 
which the defendant ought to foresee the loss occurring.  He was concerned 
that these phrases could easily be misunderstood and lead to an 
unacceptable extension of contractual liability.62  
Lord Reid’s rejection of “reasonable forseeability” in the context of contract is 
generally accepted as correct63 but consensus as to the appropriate word or 
phrase for denoting the degree of probability required has proved more 
elusive.   
While some judges in The Heron II found the phrases used in Victoria 
Laundry64 to be natural and acceptable,65 others felt them to be an 
                                                        
58 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 462. 
59 McGregor  (note 12) at 205. 
60 See, for example, The Achilleas (note 3) HL and Parsons (Livestock) v Uttley Ingham & Co [1977] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 522. 
61 See below at 30 and 43 for discussion as to the extent of loss that can be claimed. 
62 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 466. 
63 See discussion below as to the test in tort at 41. 
64 Such as “liable to result”, a “serious possibility”, a “real danger” and “on the cards” as referred to in 
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unreasonable and undesirable extension of the test in contract.66  An event 
might be very unlikely to occur and therefore not “foreseeable” under the 
test but a reasonable man in the defendant’s position might still consider 
there to be a “real danger” of it occurring.  Victoria Laundry’s suggestion of 
“on the cards”67 was comprehensively rejected in The Heron II as being too 
colloquial, uncertain and subjective in meaning.  
In summary68 the court in The Heron II considered the test to be whether a 
reasonable man in the position of the defendant would have known, through 
actual or imputed knowledge, that the type or kind of loss suffered by the 
claimant as a result of his breach would: 
• be “not unlikely to occur”;69 
• have a “considerably less than an even chance” of happening;70 
• be “not very unusual and easily foreseeable”;71  
• be “fairly and reasonably … considered as arising in the normal course of 
things”;72 or 
• occur “in the great multitude of cases”.73  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
65 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 480. 
66 Supra at 466. 
67 Victoria Laundry (note 5) at 540. 
68 McGregor (note 12) at 204 - 206. 
69 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 465. 
70 Supra at 462. 
71 Supra at 462. 
72 Supra at 470. 
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3.5.  The Achilleas 
Restatements such as those in Victoria Laundry and The Heron II played an 
important role in clarifying the Hadley v Baxendale test, which appeared all 
but settled until its application in The Achilleas. 
3.5.1.  The facts 
The bulk carrier “Achilleas” was chartered to Transfield in January 2003 on 
an amended NYPE 1946 form.  Under the terms of an extension to the charter 
in October 2003, the daily hire rate was increased to USD16,750 and the 
charterers were obliged to re-deliver the vessel to the owners by latest 
midnight on 2 May 2004.   
On 20 April 2004, the charterers gave the owners the required ten days notice 
of redelivery between 30 April and 2 May 2004.  
On or about 21 April 2004, the owners concluded a subsequent fixture with 
new charterers, Cargill International SA (“Cargill”).  The Cargill charter was 
for a period of four to six months at a daily rate of USD39,500 and with a 
laycan from 28 April to 8 May 2004.   
Cargill were entitled to cancel the Cargill charter if the vessel was not 
delivered to them by midnight on 8 May 2004.  The rise in the market74 
meant that the owners had been able to negotiate a substantially higher daily 
hire rate under the new Cargill charter than under the existing Transfield 
charter. 
On 23 April 2004, the charterers gave the owners seven days notice of 
redelivery between 30 April and 2 May.  The charterers indicated their 
intention to redeliver at the Japanese port of Oita, where the vessel was due 
to discharge the balance of her cargo of coal carried under a sub-charter from 
Qingdao in China to Tobata and Oita in Japan.   
Following discharge at Tobata, the vessel arrived at Oita on 30 April 2004 
and the charterers gave the owners a further revised notice of redelivery 
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between 8 and 9 May 2004, to take into account the anticipated delays with 
discharge.   
By 5 May 2004 the owners realised the vessel would not be redelivered in 
time for on-delivery to Cargill by midnight on 8 May 2004, being the 
cancelling date for the Cargill charter. 
There was no suggestion that the charterers or the owners were at fault or 
caused these delays.  It was simply “bad luck”.  The charterers had kept the 
owners informed as to the vessel’s schedule and redelivery estimates. 
The owners asked Cargill to extend the cancelling date of the Cargill charter 
to 11 May 2004.  However, there had been a sharp fall in the market between 
21 April 2004 when the Cargill charter was originally fixed and 5 May 2004 
when the Cargill charter was renegotiated.  So while Cargill agreed to extend 
the cancelling date, they were able to negotiate a reduction in the daily hire 
rate from USD39,500 to USD31,500 (a difference of USD8,000 per day). 
The vessel was, in the end, only re-delivered at Oita to the owners on 11 May 
2004 when she was immediately on-delivered to Cargill and operated under 
charter to them until 18 November 2004. 
3.5.2.  The claim 
It was common ground between the parties that the charterers were 
contractually bound to redeliver the vessel by midnight on 2 May 2004 and 
that, by failing to do so, the charterers had breached the contract and were 
therefore liable to the owners in damages.   
The parties agreed that the original 21 April 2004 and renegotiated 5 May 
2004 Cargill fixtures were negotiated at market rates.75  The charterers did 
not criticise the owners’ renegotiation of the charter rate in exchange for an 
extended cancelling date.76  There was no suggestion that the original Cargill 
                                                        
75 The Achilleas [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 (QBD) at 21. 
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fixture had an unusually short cancelling date or that it had any unusual or 
peculiar terms.77    
The issue in dispute was the period over which the owners’ damages should 
be calculated.  The options presented to the tribunal were either as: 
(a) A loss of profit claim:  The owners claimed damages in the amount of 
USD1,364,584.37.  This was calculated as the difference between the original 
Cargill charter rate (of USD39,500 as agreed on or about 21 April 2004) and 
the reduced rate (of USD31,500 as renegotiated on 5 May 2004) over the 
whole period of the fixture (from 08h15 on 11 May 2004 when the vessel was 
in fact redelivered until 08h15 on 18 November 2004 when the renegotiated 
Cargill charter ended), less any amounts earned under the original Transfield 
charter in the overrun period up to redelivery.  Lord Rodger described the 
owners’ primary claim as including the owners’ “loss of profit” under a 
follow-on fixture.78 
(b) Or, in the alternative, a loss of use claim:  The owners claimed damages in 
the amount of USD158,301.17.  This was calculated as the difference between 
the market rate (of USD31,500 being the renegotiated Cargill fixture of 5 May 
2004) and the Transfield charter rate (of USD16,750 as agreed in the 12 
September 2003 addendum) over the period of the overrun only (from 
midnight of 2 May 2004 when the vessel should have been redelivered, to 
08h15 on 11 May 2004 when the vessel was in fact redelivered).  This is 
essentially a claim for the loss of use of the vessel for the period that the 
charter was overrun.   
The charterers were prepared to accept the owners’ alternative loss of use 
claim, arguing that that the owners were “entitled only to the difference 
between the market rate and the charter rate for the nine days during which 
they were deprived of the ship”79 from midnight on 2 May to 08h15 on 11 
May 2004, amounting to the lower figure of USD158,301.17.   
                                                        
77 The Achilleas (note 75) QBD at 21. 
78 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 283. 
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3.5.3.  The Arbitration Tribunal 
Applying the text of Hadley v Baxendale as elucidated by Lord Reid in The 
Heron II and refined by Staughton J in The Rio Claro,80 the majority held that 
the owners’ claim fell within the first limb and the owners succeeded in their 
principal claim for USD1,364,584.37.   
The tribunal found that parties engaged in the shipping market would expect 
a vessel to remain in near continuous employment and for the markets to 
move up and down, sometimes even rapidly.81  The charterers conceded 
during submissions that the loss of a follow-on fixture was a “not unlikely” 
consequence of late redelivery.82  
In their award, the arbitrators made a further important finding that 
damages for late redelivery were generally understood by those in the 
shipping market to be limited to the overrun period only, despite there being 
no recorded case law to this effect.83  
For the dissenting arbitrator, this meant that the charterers could not have 
understood themselves to be assuming liability for the risk of the larger loss 
of profits claim.  He was concerned about the commercial uncertainty that 
might result if the award did not follow this general understanding.  
The majority were not persuaded.  They found that the loss of USD8,000 a 
day over the full period of the Cargill charter was loss of a kind that, at the 
time they entered into the addendum, the charterers “ought to have realised 
was not unlikely to result”84 from the vessel’s late redelivery.  The fact that 
the quantum of the loss was not easily identifiable due to unpredictable 
market movements or that it was much larger than expected, was 
immaterial.85  
                                                        
80 [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 173 as cited in The Achilleas (note 75) QBD at 22. 
81 The Achilleas (note 75) QBD at 22. 
82 Supra at 22. 
83 The Achilleas [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555 (AC) at 566 and 567.   
84 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 462. 
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3.5.4.  The Commercial Court 
The charterers appealed before Mr Justice Christopher Clarke in the 
Commercial Court, Queens Bench Division, alleging that the majority 
arbitrators had not properly applied the rule in Hadley v Baxendale.   
Under English law, the grounds for appeal from arbitration awards are 
limited to issues of law not fact.  Insofar as the tribunal made various 
findings of fact, therefore, the courts were obliged to follow them. 
Following a thorough review of the case law, Mr Justice Christopher Clarke 
found the majority arbitrators had not erred in law and that the true measure 
of the owners’ loss was the difference between the Cargill fixtures for the full 
period of the follow on charter.86 
3.5.5.  The Court of Appeal 
The charterers appealed and again the Appeal Court found in favour of the 
owners.  
Lords Justice Rix, Tuckey and Ward concurred that the losses claimed by the 
owners were of a type clearly foreseeable under the Hadley v Baxendale test as 
properly applied by the earlier courts.   
Furthermore, there were no “reasons of authority, principle and 
pragmatism”87 justifying a rule, as was now argued by the charterers, that 
damages for late redelivery under a time charter should be limited to the 
overrun period in the absence of any special knowledge of the follow on 
fixture.  If this decision did not sit comfortably in the shipping market, 
parties were free to regulate their potential exposures more clearly through 
agreement.88 
3.5.6.  The House of Lords 
Having failed on their three earlier attempts, the charterers finally succeeded 
with their arguments before the House of Lords. 
                                                        
86 Supra at 36. 
87 The Achilleas (note 83) AC at 569. 
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Although unanimous in their decision, the individual reasoning of the five 
Law Lords falls into two opposing camps: One headed by Lord Rodger, the 
other by Lord Hoffmann, with the remaining Lords in the middle, leaning to 
one side or the other.89  
3.5.7.  The Orthodox Approach – Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale 
Lord Rodger applied the orthodox “ordinary course of things” test from 
Hadley v Baxendale and Victoria Laundry.  Baroness Hale agreed that this 
should be the test though voiced her doubts about its application on the facts 
in this case.90   
In Lord Rodger’s view, the owners’ loss of profit claim arose because of “an 
extremely volatile market” and could not have been known to or quantified 
by the charterers at the time of contracting.91  Therefore, he concluded, the 
parties could not have contemplated the kind of loss claimed by the owners 
as “likely to result from the breach”.92  This application of the facts to the 
existing rule does not sit comfortably and is discussed in more detail below.93 
Despite her reservations, Baroness Hale preferred this orthodox approach to 
Lord Hoffmann’s broader approach.   
3.5.8.  The Broader Approach – Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope 
Lords Hoffmann and Hope referred to the test adopted in The Pegase94 with 
its emphasis on responsibility and suggested that the correct question for the 
court to ask is: Is the loss of a “kind” or “type” for which the defendant, 
objectively assessed, assumed or accepted liability at the time of contracting, 
within the commercial context of the particular contract.95   
                                                        
89 The categorisation of the two approaches into “orthodox” and “broader” respectively is taken from 
the judgement of Mr Justice Hamblen in The Sylvia (note 8). 
90 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 293. 
91 Supra at 286. 
92 Supra at 285. 
93 See criticism of the Orthodox Approach at 29 below. 
94 The Pegase (note 2) at 183 suggests the test is “[H]ave the facts in question come to the defendant's 
knowledge in such circumstances that a reasonable person in the shoes of the defendant would, if he 
had considered the matter at the time of making the contract, have contemplated that, in the event of a 
breach by him, such facts were to be taken into account when considering his responsibility for loss 
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of such breach.” 
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Baroness Hale points out that this approach requires the contract breaker to 
have, or be taken by the court to have, contemplated both the type of loss 
and having liability for that type of loss,96 thereby extending the classic 
Hadley v Baxendale test to include an assumption of liability requirement. 
Lord Hoffmann’s view is that, in most cases, where parties are shown to 
have objectively contemplated a type of loss they can also be taken to have 
contemplated assuming liability for that type of loss.97  This is based on the 
assumption “that all contractual liability is voluntarily undertaken”.98 
This approach is also known as the “agreement-centered” approach.99 
Lord Hoffmann recognises this is not an absolute rule and that in some 
unusual cases there might be evidence that a party cannot reasonably be 
taken to have assumed liability for that type of loss.100  He suggests this is 
more likely to happen in certain markets such as banking and shipping, 
where general expectations might arise out of particular types of contracts.101    
The Achilleas is, in Lord Hoffmann’s view, an example of one of these 
unusual cases because (a) the tribunal found that there was a general 
understanding in the shipping market that the owners’ losses would be 
limited to the overrun period only and (b) the parties would not have been 
aware, at the time of contracting, of the terms (date, length, rate) of any 
potential follow-on fixture and therefore unable to quantify the risks 
involved.102   
Lord Hope supports Lord Hoffmann’s approach and finds that the charterers 
did not assume responsibility in The Achilleas for the owners’ loss of profit 
because the charterers would have had no knowledge of or control over the 
                                                        
96 Baroness Hale in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 293. 
97 Lord Hoffmann in The Achilleas (note 3) HL 277. 
98 Wee (note 49) at 153. 
99 Adam Kramer “An Agreement-Centered Approach to Remoteness and Contract Damages” in Nili 
Cohen et al (eds) International Studies in the Theory of Private Law: Comparative Remedies for Breach of 
Contract (2005) at 251 and Wee (note 49) at 153. 
100 The judgement in Supershield Ltd v Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 349 
(CA).suggests that this can operate the other way as well, to allow for parties to have assumed liability 
for a particular type of loss against the contractual and commercial background in place.  
101 Lord Hoffmann in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 278. 
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terms of any follow-on fixture and therefore no ability to quantify or 
determine the extent of their potential liability.103  
Most interpretations align Lord Hope with Lord Hoffmann, although one 
writer suggests Lord Hope is “a Rodger in Hoffmann’s clothing”104 in that he 
appears to support the assumption approach but in fact decides the matter 
by applying the orthodox approach.   
3.5.10.  Lord Walker 
Lord Walker refers to both approaches but does not appear to choose one 
over the other.  He concludes by saying he agrees with the reasons given by 
Lords Hoffmann, Hope and Rodger105 despite their very different positions.   
Some writers consider him to be in Lord Hoffmann’s camp106 while others 
put him in Lord Rodger’s camp107.  He appears to apply an interpretation of 
the orthodox approach108 yet specifically approves the approach of Lord 
Hoffmann.109    
As with Lords Hoffmann, Hope and Rodger before him, he does not believe 
the charterers should be liable for loss of profit where they would have “had 
no knowledge of, or control over, the new fixture entered into by the new 
owners.”110  However, he does not go so far as to decide, in this case, if the 
defendant had or could be taken to have assumed liability. 
 
                                                        
103 Supra at 283. 
104 Robert Gay ‘The Achilleas in the House of Lords: Damages for late delivery of time chartered vessel’ 
(2008) 14 The Journal of International Maritime Law 295 at 302. 
105 Lord Walker in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 292. 
106 Gay (note 104) at 302. 
107 McGregor (note 12) at 210. 
108 Lord Walker in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 291 
109 Supra at 292. 
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3.6.  Comment on House of Lords decision in The Achilleas  
3.6.1.  Ratio decendi 
There is no clear ratio decendi from the five House of Lords judgements.  
There can be little doubt that Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale are on one side 
with Lord Hoffmann on the other but the allegiances of Lord Hope and Lord 
Walker are not obvious. 
Not even the leading academic writers agree on whose reasoning should be 
binding.  Chitty argues that Lord Hoffmann’s approach is the ratio, 
suggesting the test for remoteness has changed to now include an 
“additional and probably separate” requirement that the parties “assume 
responsibility for losses of the particular kind suffered”.111  McGregor rejects 
this and favours a ratio in line with Lord Rodger’s views.112 
Mr Justice Hamblen in The Sylvia suggests Lord Hope and Lord Walker 
support Lord Hoffmann, making the assum tion of responsibility approach 
the majority reasoning,113 though the courts have been careful to point out 
that they do not consider a new test to apply.114     
3.6.2.  Context of the judgement 
The particular arguments raised on the facts of The Achilleas had not been 
considered by the English courts before.  One reason for this is that it was 
only until the relatively recent decision in The Peonia115 that a charterers’ duty 
to redeliver by the contractual date was considered to be a strict-liability 
obligation, allowing the owners to claim damages such as to put them in the 
same position as if the contract had been properly performed.116  Another 
reason proposed for the lack of case law about unliquidated damages in the 
                                                        
111 Chitty The Law of Contracts 30ed (2008) at 26-100A.  The implications thereof are considered at 26-
100F. 
112 McGregor (note 12) at 210. 
113 The Sylvia (note 8) at 85. See discussion of The Sylvia at 35 below.   
114 The Amer Energy [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293 and Supershield Ltd v Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd 
[2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 349 (CA). 
115 The Peonia [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100. 
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shipping context is the established practice of providing for liquidated 
damages by way of demurrage.117 
Previously the courts had accepted that an owner would be entitled to claim 
the difference between the hire payable under the charter and the market 
rate for hire for the period of the overrun by way of compensation for the 
loss of use of the vessel.118  The owners in The Achilleas asked the court to 
decide whether they were entitled to claim for the additional loss of a follow-
on fixture.119   
The English commercial courts place considerable emphasis on rendering 
judgements that offer certainty and predictability120 and that reflect the 
commercial realities of the parties who choose to apply English law to their 
disputes.  Commercial certainty was cited as a reason for both allowing and 
disallowing the owners’ loss of profits claim in The Achilleas.  
The House of Lords clearly felt that it would be unjust to hold the charterers 
liable for potentially disproportionately l rge losses following a 
comparatively minor breach of charter. 
However, the legal reasoning behind their decision is arguably flawed, 
particularly in light of the factual finding by the arbitrators121 that shipping 
lawyers would have considered the owners to be entitled to claim the 
difference between the market rate and charter rate for the overrun period 
only, despite no clear authority on the point.   
As Baroness Hale points out, “[t]o rule out a whole class of loss, simply 
because the parties had not previously thought about it, risks as much 
uncertainty and injustice as letting it in.”122 
                                                        
117 McGregor (note 12) at 209. 
118 Terence Coghlin et al Time Charterers 6ed (2008) at 111. 
119 Supra at 112.  
120 The Golden Victory [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164 at 172.  
121 At para 17 of the arbitration judgement.  
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3.6.3.  Criticism of the Orthodox Approach applied by Lord Rodger 
Appeals from arbitration awards under English law are allowed on very 
limited grounds.  These include challenges on points of law but not on 
findings of fact.123  Deciding whether or not a particular kind of loss is too 
remote involves a mix of fact and law.124  For an appeal to succeed, the 
tribunal must have either applied the wrong legal test or have come to a 
conclusion that no reasonable person would have reached on the facts in 
applying the correct test.125  
Lord Rodger concluded that the appeal should fail on the latter basis but this 
is a high standard to meet.   
The Achilleas is a claim under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale.  The terms 
of the follow-on fixture were not agreed at the time the owners and the 
charterers contracted.  There could be no possibility of the charterers having 
special knowledge of the terms of the follow-on fixture at the time of 
contracting. 
The charterers had already conceded before the tribunal that the loss of a 
follow-on fixture was a “not unlikely” consequence of late redelivery.  There 
was no finding by the tribunal that the follow-on fixture was not at the 
market rate or that the market was unusually volatile in this case.  On the 
contrary, the tribunal found that market movements, even quite rapid ones, 
were common knowledge to both parties.126  Damages for loss of market are 
recognised as recoverable under English law.127  Given these findings alone, 
under the orthodox approach, the owners ought to have been entitled to 
claim the higher rate of loss.128 
                                                        
123 Unless excluded by agreement, parties can only challenge awards for lack of jurisdiction, serious 
irregularity and on a point of law under sections 68 and 69 of The Arbitration Act 1996.   
124 The Sylvia (note 8) at 87.  But earlier judgements of Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns 
Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196 at 223 and The Heron II (note 6) HL at 470 suggest it is a question of fact 
alone, as referred to by David Semark and Chirag Karia ‘Damages for Loss of Fixture – The “Achilleas” 
and The “Sylvia”’.  Available at www.simsl.com/Publications/Articles/Sylvia0810.html. [Accessed 19 
December 2011]  
125 The Nema [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 239 at 254.   
126 The Achilleas (note 83) AC at 566. 
127 The Heron II (note 6) HL. 
128 Semark (note 124) and Wee (note 49) at 153.  Also see Adam Kramer “The New Test of Remoteness 
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It is also a well established principle that, irrespective of how large the loss is, 
a defendant will be liable if the loss is of a kind or type so as to fall under one 
of the two limbs of Hadley v Baxendale.129  Put differently, a defendant should 
not be able to avoid liability simply because the loss was greater than the 
parties could have anticipated at the time of contracting.130   
McGregor suggests that Lord Rodger’s conclusion is based on an 
interpretation of the phrase “kind of loss” to refer to the losses arising from 
the particular fixture in question.131  This is a short step away from 
suggesting that the loss of profit claim failed because the parties did not 
foresee the large scale of the loss.  It also highlights the difficulties that the 
courts face in determining what the type or kind of loss in question might 
be.132 
Victoria Laundry is cited in support133 but this does not assist.  The claim for 
the loss of the lucrative dyeing contracts in Victoria Laundry failed because of 
a lack of special knowledge about the existence of the lucrative contracts 
generally and not because their unusually lucrative nature was not 
foreseen.134   
Lord Rodger’s approach has also been criticised for leaving open the option 
for an owner to claim the loss of a follow-on fixture as a “general loss of 
business profits”.135 
In an attempt to arrive at a result he believed to be fair, Lord Rodger has at 
best wrongly applied the tribunal’s findings to the law and at worst distorted 
the well-established test of Hadley v Baxendale. 
                                                        
129 Lord Hoffmann in The Achilleas (HL) at 280 cites Staughton J in The Rio Claro [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
173 at 175 and Jackson (note 53) in support. 
130 See Parsons Livestock (note 60) and below at 30 and 43. 
131 McGregor (note 12) at 217. 
132 Duxbury (note 50) at 382 to 383.  
133 McGregor (note 12) at 217 - 218. 
134 Semark (note 124). 
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3.6.4.  Criticism of the Broader Approach applied by Lord Hoffmann 
Nettleship is generally credited136 with attempting to extend the second limb 
of Hadley v Baxendale by additionally requiring the defendant to have agreed, 
through either an express or an implied term in the contract, to be liable for 
losses following from special circumstances of which he was made aware.137 
Viewing the defendant’s assumption of liability as a term of the contract has 
previously proved controversial in English law138 even if, as previously 
contended, it has little practical application between parties who have 
freedom of contract139 and is “unnecessary”.140   
The concern is that such a term will come too close to a warranty or put the 
doctrine of notice in jeopardy.141  Simply putting a party on notice of special 
circumstances should be sufficient.  It should not also require the 
incorporation of a term into the contract or for the defendants to warrant that 
they will be liable.142 
Robertson suggests those judgements purporting to decide a matter based on 
the “idea of an implied undertaking” in fact decide based on the existence or 
absence of special knowledge, with no finding made that there was express 
or implied agreement to assume liability.143  
The extension of the assumption principle into the first limb of Hadley v 
Baxendale also falls within a larger debate surrounding the roles of judges 
and parties in “shaping contractual rights and obligations”144 and freedoms 
of contract.  It raises concerns about allowing the courts to determine the 
terms of a contract that the parties themselves, in reality, might not have 
actively considered. 
                                                        
136 Victoria Laundry (note 5) at 538 and The Heron II (note 6) HL at 484. 
137 Chief Justice Bovill in Nettleship (note 4) at 506 and Justice Willes in Nettleship (note 4) at 509.   
138 See Lavery (note 228) at 47 below as to the application of the convention principle in South African 
law. 
139 The exception would be “a person, like a common carrier, who has no right to decline to enter into a 
contract” per The Heron II  (note 9) AC at 605. 
140 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 484 and The Achilleas (note 83) AC at 576. 
141 McGregor (note 12) at 227. 
142 Supra at 227. 
143 Andrew Robertson ‘The basis of the remoteness rule in contract’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 172 at 181 
and at 188. 
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This is rooted in the fiction that the courts are required to apply when 
determining what the parties would have agreed if they had thought about 
breach at the time of contracting. 
One rationale behind the assumption theory is that it protects a party who 
has knowledge, be it general or special, but who does not want “to accept the 
risk”.145   But a defendant in this position is free to make his choice clear 
through specific terms in the contract, such as limiting a carriers’ liability.146  
The voluntary nature of contracts means that parties are free to decide in 
advance what damages they are, or are not, prepared to accept liability or 
responsibility for in the event of a breach.147  
Although he recognises there are difficulties with this approach, Lord 
Hoffmann suggests that it is possible to determine whether parties accepted 
responsibilities for certain kinds or types of losses in contracts concluded in 
certain markets, such as banking and shipping, by virtue of the type of 
contract.148  He does not go so far as to suggest this requires the courts to in 
fact imply a term into the contract. 
Singling out certain types of contracts for different treatment raises its own 
difficulties.  This goes against The Heron II in which the court made it clear 
that there are no special rules applying to charterparties and may well lead 
to an inequitable result in other cases.149   
Although it is not a new idea, the broader approach was put forward by 
Lord Hoffmann150 on the basis of his subsequent research and not debated by 
counsel during submissions.151  Baroness Hale questions whether The 
Achilleas was the appropriate case in which to raise these issues.152  
                                                        
145 McGregor (note 12) at 227. 
146 Supra at 227.  This is the proposal made by Lord Justice Rix in The Achilleas (note 83) AC. 
147 “For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the 
breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be 
very unjust to deprive them” per Baron Alderson in Hadley v Baxendale (note 1) at 356. 
148 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 278. 
149 Baroness Hale in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 293. 
150 Lord Hoffmann in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 278 cites the academic works he consulted.  Lord 
Walker in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 290 comments that Lord Hoffmann brought these papers to the 
attention of the rest of the bench while they were writing their judgements. 
151 Baroness Hale in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 293. 
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There is also a strange logic in applying potentially outdated opinions of 
lawyers regarding the extent of losses that may or may not be claimed to 
justify a new approach.153  The House of Lords in The Heron II, for example, 
had no hesitation in disregarding any established shipping industry 
understanding as to the difference in approaches to foreseeability in land and 
sea carriage cases developed in The Parana nearly a century before, on the 
basis that it was incorrect.154  There does not appear to be any justification for 
extending the rule to allow parties to claim for losses based on a shared 
incorrect interpretation of the law.155 
The agreement-centered approach to remoteness applied by Lord Hoffmann 
is not a new concept.156  However, there is an inherent fiction involved in the 
idea of the courts determining the parties’ actual intentions where they are 
not expressly set out in the contract.  Such an approach potentially creates 
uncertainty for the parties, and their legal advisors, as to how the court will 
decide what they did or did not agree.157   
If a more flexible test is to be preferred then more case law will be required to 
make it clear which issues the court would take into account in which cases, 
in order to avoid uncertainty.  Robertson suggests the courts should consider 
the extent of the defendants’ liability, the proportionality of the claimants’ 
loss against the defendants’ gains, the commercial consequences of the losses 
and whether there was any opportunity to contractually limit liability.158 
Arguably, as the decision in The Sylvia suggests, The Achilleas is just such a 
case, identifying the circumstances in which the court will consider applying 
a broader approach to remoteness of contractual damages and the 
circumstances in which the court will continue to follow the established 
Hadley v Baxendale approach.  Lord Hoffman, however, views The Achilleas as 
                                                        
153 Gay (note 104) at 301. 
154 Wee (note 49) at 173.  
155 Supra at 173.  
156 Kramer (note 128) at 409. 
157 Wee (note 49) at 169.  
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an opportunity “to look for a broader principle” in determining damages 
over a range of different contracts.159 
 
3.7.  Application and effect of The Achilleas 
It is not the purposes of this dissertation to analyse all subsequent decisions 
considering the application of The Achilleas but three recent judgements in 
particular merit discussion within the shipping context and with a view to 
understanding the impact of The Achilleas on the shipping industry and 
general principles of remoteness. 
As will be seen, despite the concerns raised by a change to the orthodox 
approach in The Achilleas, subsequent decisions do not consider the test for 
remoteness to have changed: The orthodox approach remains the primary 
test with assumption of responsibility only applied in certain rare cases.160   
A brief consideration will also be given to the difference between the test for 
remoteness in tort and contract. 
3.7.1.  The Amer Energy 
In deciding whether or not to grant the owners’ late application for leave to 
appeal an arbitration award, the Commercial Court had to consider whether 
the tribunal’s decision was “obviously wrong”161 in awarding the charterers 
damages for loss of profit on a cancelled sale contract following the owners’ 
breach in delivering the vessel late under her laycan period. 
Mr Justice Flaux found it was not for two reasons: Firstly, he believed the 
majority of the House of Lords, with the possible exception of Lord 
Hoffmann, in The Achilleas did not intend to lay down a “completely new test 
as to recoverability of damages in contract and remoteness different from the 
                                                        
159 Lord Hoffmann “The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability” (2010) 14 1 The Edinburgh Law 
Review 47 at 54 and at 61. 
160 The Sylvia (note 8) at 85. 
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so-called rule in Hadley v Baxendale”162 based on an assumption of 
responsibility by the party in breach.   
Even Lord Hoffmann acknowledged that a departure from the established 
Hadley v Baxendale test would be unusual163 and it could not be correct to say 
that the Hadley v Baxendale test should not apply to shipping cases.164  The 
tribunal was therefore correct to apply the established Hadley v Baxendale test, 
as they had done. 
Secondly, on the tribunal’s particular findings of fact in this case,165 the 
owners’ claim would fail irrespective of which test was applied.166  The type 
of loss in question fell under both the first and second limb of Hadley v 
Baxendale and was also “of a kind or type for which the owners ought fairly 
to be taken to have accepted responsibility”167 under the test formulated by 
Lord Hoffmann.168  So even if the owners were right and a new test had been 
formulated in The Achilleas, the owners would fail on the facts and their 
request for leave to appeal was denied.  
3.7.2.  The Sylvia 
At first blush, the facts in The Sylvia and The Achilleas appear similar but their 
outcomes were very different.   
In both cases, the court was asked to decide the correct measure of damages 
for the loss of a fixture following a breach of the primary charter.  The key 
difference is that The Sylvia concerned the loss of a sub fixture under a 
continuing head charter while the charterers’ breach in The Achilleas caused 
the owners to miss the laycan of a follow on (not sub) fixture after redelivery 
under the primary charterparty.   
The tribunal found the owners of The Sylvia failed to exercise due diligence 
and breached their maintenance obligations under the applicable amended 
                                                        
162 The Amer Energy (note 7) at 295. 
163 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 278. 
164 The Amer Energy (note 7) at 295. 
165 Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, appeals to the Courts are only permitted on findings of law 
and not on findings of fact. 
166 The Amer Energy (note 7) at 295. 
167 Supra at 295. 
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NYPE 1946 charter by failing to maintain the vessel’s cargo holds.  As a 
result, the vessel was detained by Canadian Port State Control, had to 
undergo repairs and missed her laycan date under a sub voyage charter that 
had been fixed by the charterers with Conagra before the vessel’s deficiencies 
were identified.  Conagra cancelled their sub fixture and the charterers 
negotiated a substitute sub fixture with York at a less favourable rate, to 
commence after completion of the repairs.   
The owners argued (applying The Achilleas) that the charterers were only 
entitled to claim the difference between the market and missed charter rates 
while the repairs were being done (the period of delay).  The owners argued 
that the loss of profit on the cancelled Contra sub-charter was too remote. 
However, the charterers successfully both at arbitration and on final appeal 
to the Commercial Court, claimed for this loss of profit calculated as the 
difference between the market and missed charters for the full period of the 
Conagra charter.  This is in contrast to The Achilleas where the owners were 
unable to recover their losses under the follow on fixture.   
Acknowledging the “confusion” surrounding the binding majority decision 
in the House of Lords169 Mr Justice Hamblen of the Commercial Court 
differentiated between the orthodox approach to remoteness of damages 
endorsed by Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale in The Achilleas (applying the 
ordinary Hadley v Baxendale test to determine whether the parties could 
reasonably be taken to have contemplated the kind of loss in question) and 
the broader approach preferred by Lords Hoffmann and Hope (considering 
whether the parties would reasonably have contemplated, in addition to the 
kind of loss under the ordinary rule, an assumption of liability or 
responsibility for the loss in question).170   
He was at pains to make it clear that, as was the view taken in The Amer 
Energy171 and put forward by Chitty,172 “there is no new generally applicable 
                                                        
169 The Sylvia (note 8) at 85.  
170 Supra at 84 – 85.  
171 The Amer Energy (note 7) at 295. 










MELISSA DEACON (DCNMEL001)  PAGE  37 
legal test of remoteness in damages. … [T]he orthodox approach … remains 
the ‘standard rule’ and it is only in relatively unusual cases, such as The 
Achilleas itself, where a consideration of assumption of responsibility [Lord 
Hoffmann’s broader approach] may be required.”173  For losses arising under 
the orthodox approach, an assumption of responsibility can often be imputed 
in any event.174 
Applying the orthodox approach in The Sylvia, Mr Justice Hamblen agreed 
with the tribunal’s finding that the loss in question fell under the first limb of 
Hadley v Baxendale and was “of a kind or type which would have been within 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time that the contract was 
made as being not unlikely to result”.175  Sub letting by way of a voyage 
charter is common and often expressly permitted under a time charter.176  
Damages for loss of a sub fixture are generally considered as recoverable.177   
Mr Justice Hamblen did not find The Sylvia to be “one of those ‘unusual’ 
cases in which it might be said that assumption of responsibility had to be 
addressed”178 because:  
(a) There is no “general market understanding”179 limiting the recoverable 
damages as was the case in The Achilleas.  In fact, the general 
understanding is that the loss of a sub voyage fixture under a continuing 
head charter is r coverable;180 
(b) Unlike The Achilleas, the maximum period of damages in a claim for a 
lost sub fixture under a continuing time charter cannot exceed the 
maximum period of the time charter.  Therefore, the damages awarded 
will not “be unquantifiable, unpredictable, uncontrollable or 
disproportionate” as is the case with a follow-on charter of (potentially) 
any length;181 
                                                        
173 The Sylvia (note 8) at 86.  
174 Supra at 86 and at 91. 
175 Supra at 88. 
176 Supra at 88. 
177 Supra at 88 – 89. 
178 Supra at 88.  
179 Supra at 89.  
180 Supra at 89 and summarising Cooke and Young Voyage Charters 3ed at para 21.90.   
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(c) Parties will not usually be protected by the market for the loss of a sub 
voyage fixture in the same way as they would usually be for the loss of a 
follow on time fixture.  The Achilleas was an unusual case where the loss 
was much greater than might usually have been anticipated as a result of 
the particularly volatile market at that time.  There was no suggestion of 
a similarly volatile market at play here;182 and  
(d) The Conagra and York charters were at a market rate.183  As with Victoria 
Laundry, the loss in question fell squarely under the first leg of the Hadley 
v Baxendale test.  There was no suggestion of any special knowledge or 
unusual terms being a factor at play.184  
Leave to appeal was refused so there will be no further judgement in this 
case from the Appeal Court or Supreme Court, as the House of Lords is now 
known.  
Mr Justice Hamblen’s reasoning for not applying the broader approach in 
The Sylvia suggests that there are only very few circumstances in which this 
approach would be appropriate.185 
3.7.3.  The Paragon 
The Amer Energy and The Sylvia have gone some way to clarify the changes, if 
any, to the existing test but how can the owners protect their position?  For 
example, what options are available to the owners where the last voyage 
order of their time charterers is illegitimate? 
A time charterers’ last voyage order is considered to be illegitimate where, at 
the time the order is given, “it cannot reasonably be expected that” the 
charterers will redeliver before the end of the charter period.186  The owners 
can call on their charterers to give revised legitimate last voyage orders.  If 
the charterers fail to do so, the owners can choose to perform the illegitimate 
last voyage or not.187  The owners are entitled to claim damages for losses 
                                                        
182 Supra at 90. 
183 Supra at 91.  
184 Supra at 91.  
185 Semark (note 124). 
186 The Paragon (note 199) at 660. 
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that they suffer as a result of an illegitimate last voyage order, whether they 
have chosen to perform the voyage or not.188  The measure of damages, 
where the owners choose to perform an illegitimate last voyage, is at the 
charter rate until the end of the charter period and thereafter at the market 
rate for the time of the overrun.189 
In one view, the effect of the decision in the The Achilleas is that damages will 
be calculated in the same way, even where the charterers knowingly order an 
illegitimate last voyage.190   
The legitimacy of the last voyage in The Achilleas was not in dispute191 so any 
views expressed by the courts on illegitimate last voyages were made obiter.   
Baroness Hale192 suggested the owners could avoid their damages being 
limited to loss of use only by simply refusing to perform an illegitimate last 
voyage and having the vessel redeliver early.  While this may be effective in 
some cases, disputes about illegitimate last voyages often arise precisely 
because there is not enough evidence at the time the order is given to make 
an accurate prediction as to whether the voyage will be completed within the 
required timeframe or not.193  This leaves the owners in a difficult position. 
Alternatively, Baroness Hale suggested the owners could get the charterers’ 
express agreement to pay the higher rate of damages on a “without 
prejudice” basis194 if the last voyage is later judged to be illegitimate.195  The 
obvious difficulty with this approach is that the charterers are not obliged to 
agree and may not be inclined to agree to such a proposal.   
Lord Justice Rix’s196 suggestion that owners put the charterers on notice of 
the next fixture will no longer assist in light of the House of Lords’ 
reasoning.197 
                                                        
188 The Dione [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 115 at 118. 
189 Lord Hoffmann in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 280 and cited in The Paragon (note 199) at 662. 
190 Gay (note 104) at 299. 
191 Lord Rodger in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 283.  
192 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 292. 
193 Gay (note 104) at 299. 
194 As was agreed in The Gregos (note 187). 
195 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 292. 
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Another proposal is for the law to impose a rule on the parties such that that 
the owners, faced with a potentially illegitimate last voyage and insufficient 
information to form a view on its legitimacy, could accept the voyage order 
on the basis that, if it later turned out to be illegitimate, they are entitled to 
claim the loss of profit from a lucrative subsequent fixture they lost as a 
result of late redelivery.198  While this may address concerns about apparent 
fairness in allowing the owners to claim a larger amount where their 
charterers are at fault for late redelivery, introducing the notion of fault into 
the determination of recoverable losses is not without its difficulties.  
The owners in The Paragon199 attempted to deal with the issue by inserting 
the following clause in their time charter: 
"The Charterers hereby undertake the obligation/responsibility to 
make thorough investigations and every arrangement in order to 
ensure that the last voyage of this Chart r will in no way exceed 
the maximum period under this Charter Party.  If, however, 
Charterers fail to comply with this obligation and the last voyage 
will exceed the maximum period, should the market rise above 
the Charter Party rate in the meantime, it is hereby agreed that the 
charter hire will be adjusted to reflect the prevailing market level 
from the 30th day prior to the maximum period [d]ate until actual 
redelivery of the vessel to the Owners." 
In the event, the charterers redelivered six days late in a rising market.  In 
contravention of the agreed clause, they paid hire at the agreed charter rate 
up to the date of delivery and then at the (higher) market rate for the six days 
overrun.  The owners claimed hire payable at the market rate for thirty days 
before the end of the charter.   
The arbitration tribunal at first instance found the clause to be a penalty and 
therefore unenforceable.  The owners appealed but Mr Justice Blair agreed 
                                                                                                                                                             
197 Gay (note 104) at 299. 
198 Supra at 299 to 300. 
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with the tribunal in first instance that the clause in question was a penalty.200  
In reaching this conclusion, he had to consider what losses the owners would 
have been entitled to claim for the charterers’ breach of their redelivery 
obligations.  He acknowledged that the owners face difficulties in 
determining whether a voyage is legitimate or not at the time the last voyage 
orders are given.  However, the owners would not have been entitled to 
claim for the losses envisaged by the clause had the charterers not breached 
their redelivery obligations.  If the owners had chosen to accept early 
redelivery, they would still only have been entitled to claim at the market 
rate for any overrun period.201   
As the law currently stands, therefore, owners facing a pote tially 
illegitimate last voyage cannot protect their position by agreeing to a clause 
with their charterers for the payment of damages higher than they would 
otherwise be entitled to claim. 
3.7.4.  The test in tort – “reasonable foreseeability” 
While the test for factual causation remains the same whether in contract or 
in tort,202 despite the suggestion in earlier cases203 that there is or should be 
only one principle of damages applicable to both contract and tort, the 
modern approach has been to view the tests for remoteness of damages in 
contract (“contemplation”) and tort (“reasonable foreseeability”)204 as 
different.205  
The tortfeasor defendant is liable to his innocent claimant for losses 
“reasonably foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, 
                                                        
200 Under established English law principles, clauses providing for liquidated damages to be payable in 
the event of a breach are valid only where they are a genuine pre-estimate of recoverable loss in the 
context of that agreement, aimed at compensating a party for his losses and not designed to deter the 
other party from breaching the contract.  See summary of the authorities on penalties in The Paragon 
(note 199) at 662. 
201 The Paragon (note 199) at 664. 
202 McGregor (note 12) at 768. 
203 Lord Pearce in The Heron II (note 6) HL at 479 refers to the arguments put before the court in The 
Wagon Mound No 2 [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 657. 
204 The Wagon Mound No 1 [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1.  
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unless the risk is so small that a reasonable man would in the whole 
circumstances feel justified in neglecting it.”206  
The contract breaker, on the other hand, is liable to his innocent claimant for 
losses flowing naturally from the breach or within the parties’ contemplation 
at the time of contracting.   
The concern with adapting a single test to fit both is that it will result in “a 
rule that is satisfactory for neither.”207   
Rationale behind the different approach in tort 
The justification for this difference has its origins in the nature of the 
relationship of the parties in contract as opposed to tort.208  
Freedom of contract is a fundamental principle of English law.  Parties to a 
contract come together voluntarily.  They have an awareness of one another 
and they undertake mutual duties.  They can choose how to regulate their 
relationship.  They have the option to cater, through additional clauses, for 
any reasonable or foreseeable risks they are particularly concerned about209 
even so far as to agree liquidated damages clauses or disclosure of special 
circumstances.  Given these opportunities, it would be unfair to make the 
claimant bear losses that do not flow naturally from the breach.210   
Where a tort is committed, on the other hand, the innocent claimant has “no 
opportunity … to protect himself in that way, and the tortfeasor cannot 
reasonably complain if he has to pay for some very unusual but nevertheless 
foreseeable damage which results from his wrongdoing.”211   
Parties to a tort claim do not come together voluntarily.  They are often 
strangers with no prior knowledge of one another.  The law imposes a duty 
of care on the tortfeasor to act in such a way as not to harm strangers.  The 
                                                        
206 Supra at 464. 
207 Supra at 479. 
208 “The approach in tort will … normally be different simply because the relationship of the parties is 
different” per Lord Hodson in The Heron II (note 6) HL at 478. 
209 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 464. 
210 Cory and Others v Thames Ironworks and Shipbuilding Company Ltd (1868) LR 3 OB 181. 
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innocent claimant usually has no earlier opportunity to protect himself 
should the tortfeasor breach that duty of care.   
Type/kind/extent of damage 
The English law of tort recognises a well-established rule that the tortfeasor 
should take his victim as he finds him, also referred to as the eggshell skull 
rule.  This means that even if the greater extent of the particular damage was 
not reasonably foreseeable or caused intentionally, the tortfeasor defendant 
will still be liable for the higher level of damage.   
Similarly, where a breach of contract causes physical injury or damage, it is 
irrelevant that the plaintiff suffered losses to a greater extent than were 
foreseeable, as long as the type or kind of loss was foreseeable.212    
Effect of the difference 
“Reasonable foreseeability … may result in [the defendant] having to pay for 
something that, although reasonably foreseeable, was very unusual, not 
likely to occur and much greater in amount than he could have 
anticipated.”213   
While not every reasonably foreseeable loss arises naturally or is in the 
parties’ contemplation, all losses arising naturally or within the parties’ 
contemplation are reasonably foreseeable214 suggesting that “[t]he modern 
rule in tort … imposes a much wider liability” than in contract.215 
In truth, there is no hard and fast rule as to which results in a wider liability.  
Liability for damages in contract could be less, the same or greater than in 
tort depending on the facts and claim in question.216    
Indeed, Lord Denning suggests that the tests in contract and tort will often 
amount to the same test, depending on the nature of the tort or contractual 
damage.217 
                                                        
212 Parsons Livestock (note 60) at 527 and McGregor (note 12) at 216. 
213 Lord Hope in The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 281. 
214 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 466. 
215 Supra at 464. 
216 McGregor (note 12) at 775. 
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In SAAMCO,218 which preceded The Achilleas, Lord Hoffmann advocated an 
assumption of responsibility approach to the breach of a duty of care,219 
considering that even natural and reasonably foreseeable losses could be 
unrecoverable in tort or contract in certain circumstances.220  This approach 
was rooted in the idea that the courts should consider the assumption of 
responsibility within the context of the “scope” of the contractual obligations 
or duty owed. Lord Hoffmann’s attempts to extend this concept in The 
Achilleas have been criticised on the basis that considerations as to the scope 
of the contract are more easily applied to breach of duty type-cases and less 
easily applied to strict-liability obligations such as those in The Achilleas.221 
If Hadley v Baxendale or The Achilleas had been decided on the basis of the test 
in tort rather than contract, would the outcomes have been different?   
While the losses suffered by the Hadley claimants might have been unlikely, 
they were still a possibility.222  Similarly, it would have been at least 
reasonably foreseeable that The Achilleas defendants would suffer a loss of 
profit for the full period of the new fixture in the event of a late redelivery.223    
So, in these cases liability in tort might be wider than in contract, but the 
acquisition of special knowledge under the second limb of the rule in Hadley 
v Baxendale can sometimes lead to liability being wider in contract than in 
tort.224  A loss that is not reasonably foreseeable is not recoverable in tort but 
might be recoverable in contract if the parties were aware of special 
circumstances that increase liability.   
Application of a broader approach in tort 
Kramer suggests that it may sometimes be appropriate to apply the 
agreement-centered contractual test to claims brought in tort, for example 
                                                        
218 South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1997] AC 191. 
219 The claim was made both in tort of contract and the scope of the duty of care obligation considered 
as being the same for both. 
220 Kramer (note 128) at 410. 
221 Gay (note 104) at 301. 
222 The Heron II (note 6) HL at 464. 
223 McGregor (note 12) at 769.  The influence of the SAAMCO (note 218) test in tort may have lead to 
the same outcome had The Achilleas (note 3) HL been decided in tort. 
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where the parties have a pre-existing relationship or an opportunity to 
allocate risk, but this does not go so far as to suggest that this amounts to “an 
agreement as to the allocation of that risk” in tort.225   
Lord Hoffmann’s endorsement of the agreement-centered approach in The 
Achilleas and his emphasis of the scope of duty in SAAMCO may narrow the 
differences between the tests, at least for some, torts and contracts.226 
 
                                                        
225 Kramer (note 99) at 284.  
226 See criticism of the application of the SAAMCO “scope” principle to strict liability obligations per 










MELISSA DEACON (DCNMEL001)  PAGE  46 
4.  SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
Similar to the English law approach from Hadley v Baxendale, the general rule 
in South African law is: 
“To ensure that undue hardship is not imposed on the defaulting 
party …  the defaulting party's liability is limited in terms of broad 
principles of causation and remoteness, to (a) those damages that 
flow naturally and generally from the kind of breach of contract in 
question and which the law presumes the parties contemplated as a 
probable result of the breach, and (b) those damages that, although 
caused by the breach of contract, are ordinarily regarded in law as 
being too remote to be recoverable unless, in the special 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract, the parties 
actually or presumptively contemplated that they would probably 
result from its breach … The damages described in limb (a) and the 
first rule in Hadley v Baxendale are often labelled ''general'' or 
''intrinsic'' damages, while those described in limb (b) and the 
second rule in Hadley v Baxendale are called ''special'' or ''extrinsic'' 
damages.”227 
Though unlike the English courts, the South African courts have expressly 
recognised the application of the convention principle to special damages. 
 
                                                        
227 As restated by Corbett JA in Holmdene Brickworks (note 242) at 687 – 688 and approved by Nienaber 
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4.1.  Lavery v Jungheinrich 
Some 75 years after Hadley v Baxendale, no doubt influenced by Nettleship but 
without the benefit of the subsequent Victoria Laundry restatement or The 
Heron II analysis, the South African Appellate Division considered the test 
for remoteness of contractual damages in Lavery v Jungheinrich.228   
While allowing a claim for general damages for loss of profit, by a 
unanimous decision the Appellate Division rejected the Lavery plaintiffs’ 
claim for special damages, finding their loss of future business and business 
reputation (calculated as the difference between the profit made the previous 
year and the following year) could not be supposed to have been within the 
reasonable contemplation of the defendants at the time of contracting, as the 
probable consequence of supplying a defective product to the plaintiffs.229   
To succeed with a claim for special damages, the defendant must have, or 
must be taken by the court to have, either contracted “on the basis of”230 
special knowledge that the loss suffered would probably result from the 
breach in question or must have agreed, as a term of the contract, to pay 
damages for the loss in question in the event of the breach in question.231   
The test applied in Lavery, particularly the latter requirement as laid down by 
Wessels JA, requires the court to go further than just determining which 
special damages could be supposed to have been within the parties’ 
reasonable contemplation as inferred from any special circumstances known 
to them at the time of contracting or from the subject matter of the contract 
itself.232  The parties must also have contracted “on the basis of” such special 
knowledge or have agreed it as a term of the contract.233 
 
                                                        
228 Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156. 
229 Supra at 177. 
230 Curtlewis JA in Lavery (note 228) at 172. 
231 Wessels JA in Lavery (note 228) at 177. 
232 Lavery (note 228) at 169.  Referred to as the “contemplation principle” in Shatz Investments (note 234) 
at 552. 










MELISSA DEACON (DCNMEL001)  PAGE  48 
4.2.  Shatz Investments 
After a forty-five year gap, Trollip JA’s assenting judgement in Shatz 
Investments234 confirmed that the convention principle continues to apply in 
South African law.235   Though he recognised that this approach was not 
without criticism both locally and abroad236 and that many subsequent South 
African decisions had applied the contemplation principle,237 he upheld 
Lavery’s approach.238    
From the terms of the commercial lease agreement between the parties in 
Shatz Investments, it was clear that the plaintiffs’ business was likely to be 
successful and therefore develop goodwill as it was the only such business in 
the area sporting a large potential client base.  It was also clear that the 
parties had contemplated it might be disposed of in the future given the long 
term of the lease and the particular provisions on sub-letting.239   
By virtue of these express contractual clauses, Trollip JA concluded that the 
defendant had contemplated, at the time of contracting, that the plaintiff 
would suffer the loss of his business’ goodwill if the defendant let a nearby 
property to a competitor in breach of their agreement and that the defendant 
had also “virtually or tacitly assumed liability for such damages”.240  
                                                        
234 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 (2) SA 545 (A). 
235 Supra at 554. 
236 Supra at 554. 
237 Supra at 554. 
238 Supra at 554. 
239 Supra at 555. 
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4.3.  Holmdene Brickworks 
The defendants supplied the plaintiffs with defective bricks resulting in the 
plaintiffs having to demolish and rebuild the structure using replacement 
bricks purchased from another source.  Confirming and re-stating the 
approach to remoteness in contractual damages in Shatz Investments,241 
Corbett JA in Holmdene Brickworks242 allowed the plaintiffs’ claim for loss of 
profits under the heading of general damages.243  
 
4.4.  Thoroughbred Breeders 
The Thoroughbred Breeders244 plaintiffs were awarded contractual damages 
from their auditors, who were found to have failed to identify discrepancies 
in the plaintiffs’ accounts and thereby preventing further losses from 
occurring.   
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Nienaber JA confirmed Holmdene 
Brickworks’ restatement quoted above.245   
He considered the degree of probability required for a claim in general 
damages246 and concluded that there did not have to be a high likelihood of 
the loss occurring but that it should at least be “not improbable” and 
“tend[ing] to follow upon the breach as a matter of course.”247   
The court a quo had found that the auditors “virtually or tacitly assumed 
liability” for the loss suffered248 but it was not necessary to decide on appeal 
whether South African law should continue to support the convention 
principle or not.   
                                                        
241 Holmdene Brickworks (note 242) at 687. 
242 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A). 
243 Supra at 688. 
244 Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA). 
245 Supra at 579 – 580. 
246 Being “those damages that flow naturally and generally from the kind of breach of contract in 
question and which the law presumes the parties contemplated as a probable result of the breach” per 
Holmdene Brickworks (note 242) at 687 – 688. 
247 Thoroughbred Breeders (note 244) SCA at 581. 
248 Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 1999 4 SA 968 (W) at 1030.  Christie in The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 5ed (2007) at 552 suggests that this finding was a “stretch” by the court, in 
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Nienaber JA did, however, note that the convention approach had “long 
been discredited in England” with particular reference to the English case of 
The Pegase.249   He pointed to the “flexible or supple test”250 for causation 
recently evolved in fields such as crime, delict and estoppel suggesting that 
this could be extended to develop a similar flexible approach for remoteness 
of contractual damages where “[t]he circumstances of each case will 
determine where the emphasis belongs.”251   
The flexible or supple test that he referred to was described in Standard 
Chartered Bank as “one in which factors such as reasonable foreseeability, 
directness, the absence or presence of a novus actus interveniens, legal policy, 
reasonability, fairness and justice all play their part”.252  
The difficulty with this approach in contract, as recognised by Nienaber 
JA,253 is that parties have an opportunity to determine the ambit and extent 
of their obligations, unlike in the case of crimes or delicts or estoppel.  
Nienaber JA suggested this could be dealt with through the judicial 
application of a more flexible test.254  While that may be so, it could also have 
the effect of creating more uncertainty for parties trying to establish their 
likely exposure to a breach or potential breach.255 
The majority of the bench concurred with Nienaber JA’s decision but did not 
adopt his suggestion of a more flexible test.256  The majority felt that “[w]hile 
the approach has attractions” its shortcomings had not been sufficiently 
considered so preferred to let the question stand over for another case.257  
 
                                                        
249 Thoroughbred Breeders (note 244) SCA at 582.  
250 Supra at 582. 
251 Supra at 583. 
252 Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) at 765. 
253 Thoroughbred Breeders (note 244) SCA at 583. 
254 Supra at 583. 
255 The difficulties with this approach in the English courts are discussed at 28 above.  
256 Thoroughbred Breeders (note 244) SCA at 597. 
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4.5.  The Snow Crystal 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal had opportunity to consider 
remoteness of contractual damages in The Snow Crystal.258   
The vessel was unable to make full use of the dry dock facilities reserved at 
Cape Town due to a contractual breach of the contract entered into with the 
owners by the port authorities.  As a result, the vessel underwent temporary 
work at Cape Town in the time available and the balance of the work was 
completed at dry dock in Bulgaria a year later.  The vessel’s owners claimed 
against the port authorities for the additional costs and off-hire at the 
Bulgarian dry dock.  Unlike in The Achilleas and The Sylvia, there was no 
additional loss of a follow-on fixture as a result of the port authorities’ 
breach. 
The Appeal Court disagreed with the defendant port authority that the losses 
claimed by the owners were special damages259 and found that the off-hire 
and additional costs at Bulgaria flowed “ s a natural consequence of the 
breach”.260  It was to be expected that a dry docking scheduled some six 
months in advance such as the one in Cape Town was planned for a period 
when the vessel was off hire and that, on completion of the works, the vessel 
would go back on-hire.  There were no special circumstances at play.  The 
costs and off-hire at Bulgaria were foreseeable.   
In summary, the test for remoteness of damages was set out by the court as 
follows:  
“[T]o answer the question whether damages flow naturally and 
generally from the breach one must inquire whether, having regard 
to the subject-matter and terms of the contract, the harm that was 
suffered can be said to have been reasonably foreseeable as a 
realistic possibility.  In the case of ‘special damages’, on the other 
hand, the foreseeability of the harm suffered will be dependent on 
                                                        
258 Transnet Ltd v The MV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA).  
259 Supra at para 34. 










MELISSA DEACON (DCNMEL001)  PAGE  52 
the existence of special circumstances known to the parties at the 
time of contracting.”261  
While the test as set out in The Snow Crystal requires the South African 
court to take into account the subject matter and terms of the contract, no 
reference is made to the importance of considering the particular kind or 
type of loss.  This is an aspect emphasised in the tests laid down in the 
more recent English court decisions, including The Achilleas.  The earlier 
decision in BAT Rhodesia262 suggests that the South African courts would 
consider the type or kind of loss, despite the difficulty in determining 
which losses might be classed as the same kind or type.263  
                                                        
261 Supra at para 35. 
262 BAT Rhodesia Ltd v Fawcett Security Organisation (Sailsbury) Ltd 1972 4 SA 103 (R) as referred to in 
Christie (note 248) at 552. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
None of the judgements that followed Lavery considered it appropriate to 
decide whether South African law should continue to apply the convention 
principle to special damages.   
The point was not argued in Shatz Investments while the court in Holmdene 
Brickworks, Thoroughbred Breeders and The Snow Crystal considered it 
unnecessary to decide because losses were awarded as general damages and 
not as special damages.   
It would seem, therefore, that the convention principle remains applicable to 
special damages and has not been extended to claims for general damages 
under South African law.   
Given the widespread judicial and academic criticism of the convention 
principle, a South African court having cause to consider the matter in the 
future would probably dispense with the strict convention principle in the 
case of special damages.   
In the English courts, the additional “term of the contract” requirement of the 
convention principle has not generally found favour and certainly not in the 
form of an express term.264  Lord Hoffmann’s broader approach in The 
Achilleas does not go so far as to adopt the convention principle into English 
law.  It does, however, propose a shift to a more flexible agreement-centered 
approach.   
Lord Hoffmann is at pains to emphasise the importance of the common 
intention of the parties when considering contractual remoteness265 and has 
separately described his vision for the test as follows:266  
“If the effect of The Achilleas is, as I hope, to free the common law from 
the need to explain its decisions on contractual remoteness of damage 
                                                        
264 As was made clear in Victoria Laundry (note 5) and The Heron II (note 6) HL.  More recently Diplock 
LJ suggested that the defendant gives the claimant an “implied undertaking … to bear the larger 
measure of loss” per Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428 at 1448. 
265 The Achilleas (note 3) HL at 278. 
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by the single criterion of probability and to enable it to recognise that 
liability for damages may be influenced by common sense distinctions 
between different commercial relationships, it will be the result of a 
combination between judicial decision-making and academic writing.” 
While this may widen the scope for the bench, contracting parties and their 
legal advisors are potentially left uncertain and unable to accurately predict 
how the courts will view their exposure in the event of breach.   
As one writer comments: “The desire to uphold the parties’ intentions has 
never been thought to justify conferring a broad, unstructured and 
unfettered discretion on judges to ascertain the parties’ intentions from all 
the circumstances.”267  Clearly any extension of the Hadley v Baxendale test 
cannot be at the expense of commercial certainty. 
While not binding precedent in South African, the South African courts 
would certainly take close note of the development of the English law rule of 
remoteness in The Achilleas and subsequent cases such as The Sylvia.268   
The Sylvia makes it clear that, for now at least, the English courts are unlikely 
to apply Lord Hoffmann’s broader approach except in the most unusual of 
cases.269   The Sylvia is a judgement in the first instance and it may be that the 
Supreme Court as the House of Lords is now known, will seek to re-assert 
the broader approach of The Achilleas in the future. 
For now, though, the English “law of remoteness in contract damages 
remains as it has stood unchallenged for the century and a half since its first 
exposition in Hadley v Baxendale”.270   
 
                                                        
267 Wee (note 49) at 176. 
268 Nienaber JA in Thoroughbred Breeders (note 244) SCA at 580 - 581. 
269 Semark (note 124).  
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